The Keys to the Kingdom by Jeff Shear

Author:Jeff Shear [Shear, Jeff]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 978-0-307-83220-7
Published: 2013-04-02T16:00:00+00:00

18

The Grandfather Clause

“In my perspective, what turned me against these folks at the Pentagon—and I’m a reasonably moderate character, I’m not viciously partisan—but what pissed me off was that they just disregarded [the Senate’s] advice.”

—Congressional staffer speaking on background about the FS-X

GLENN RUDD said that he saw the October 1, 1988, deadline as just another date on his calendar. Indeed, he didn’t even bother to pencil it in. “We considered at the time the legislation [Defense Authorization Act of 1989] was passed that this thing [the FS-X] was a done deal. I’m not even sure it [the agreement] wasn’t initialed by then. It obviously wasn’t signed, but it was completely negotiated. We just didn’t consider that this would be a problem.”

That was a bad mistake, and the Japanese would later shout betrayal. Rudd pleaded innocence. “This just wasn’t on my scope,” he said, drawling out the word “scope” for emphasis. He recalled that he didn’t push the Japanese to reach a decision over the five-month period in which they deliberated because he feared they might interpret queries from him as more American pressure, the much resented gaiatsu.

At his rank as the number two man in the Defense Security Assistance Agency, Rudd was beyond getting down in the trenches and taking on the day-to-day responsibilities of a negotiator. Rudd’s job description did not call for him to gauge wind direction and velocity on Capitol Hill. That responsibility was delegated. In this case, the task fell to Rudd’s deputy for planning, Tim Tyler. That Rudd was involved at all in the negotiations says something about the growing concern on the U.S. side for the way the program was developing.

Rudd became involved because of orders he received from Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage. “Rich called me and told me he wanted this thing to stay in political channels. I more or less matriculated into the role [of negotiator].”

Craig Richardson pointed out that Rudd got involved in the FS-X after Richardson told him about the “beauty contest” in Tokyo. Richardson had told Prestowitz of Rudd’s reaction to this wake-up call, and he used it in his book Trading Places: “Although [General] Brown fell asleep in the briefing, Rudd was visibly upset and screamed at the chagrined Button [who had shared his notes on the U.S. negotiating position with his Japanese counterpart], ‘We have to get smarter.’ ”

Clearly, the message Rudd was now getting from his lieutenant, Tim Tyler, was that the FS-X deal was on track. As Rudd put it: “We didn’t think at the time that Congress was going to create a serious problem about the MOU. We thought we had basically satisfied them,” adding with candor, “We were pretty apparently mistaken.”

Tim Tyler was completely confident that he had Congress under control. After all, the FS-X was too big a project and the DoD was already too far along in the negotiations to turn back now. At the very least, they had a powerful argument to grandfather in an agreement that had been “initialed” before the advent of the new law.

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